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1. Introduction
Although the identity type Id(a, b) is defined as an inductive type with only one single
constructor refl, it is a concept in Martin-Lo¨f type theory [17] [15] [16] that is hard to get
intuition for. The reason is that it is, as a type family, parametrized twice over the same
type, while the constructor only expects one argument: refla : a = a, where a = b is an
alternative notation for Id(a, b). In fact, it is the simplest and most natural occurrence of
this phenomenon.
A result by Hofmann and Streicher [7] is that we can not prove refla to be the only
inhabitant of the type a = a, that is, the principle of unique identity proofs (UIP) is not
derivable. Some time later, Hedberg [6] formulated a sufficient condition on a type to satisfy
UIP, namely that its equality is decidable.
The core argument of the proof by Hofmann and Streicher is that types can be inter-
preted as groupoids, i.e. categories of which all morphisms are invertible. Their conjecture
that the construction could also be performed using higher groupoids was only made precise
more that ten years later. Awodey and Warren [2] as well as, independently, Voevodsky [29]
explained that types can be regarded as, roughly speaking, topological spaces. Conse-
quently, an exciting new direction of constructive formal mathematics attracted researchers
from originally very separated areas of mathematics, and homotopy type theory [27] was
born.
The current article is not only on homotopy type theory, but on Martin-Lo¨f type theory
in general, even though we expect that the results are most interesting in the context of
homotopy type theory. We start with Hedberg’s Theorem [6] and describe multiple simple
ways of strengthening it, one of them involving propositional truncation [27], also known as
bracket types [1] or squash types [3].
Propositional truncation is a concept that provides a sequel to the Propositions-as-
Types paradigm [8]. If we regard a type as the correspondent of a mathematical statement,
a proposition, and its inhabitants of proofs thereof, we have to notice that there is a slightly
unsatisfactory aspect. A proof of a proposition in mathematics is usually not thought to
contain any information apart from the fact that the proposition is true; however, a type can
have any number of inhabitants, and therefore any number of witnesses of its truth. Hence
it seems natural to regard only some types as propositions, namely those which have at most
one inhabitant. The notion of propositional truncation assigns to a type the proposition
that this type is inhabited. To make the connection clearer, these types are even called
propositions, or h-propositions, in homotopy type theory. With this in mind, we want to be
able to say that a type is inhabited without having to reveal an inhabitant explicitly. This
is exactly what propositional truncation ‖−‖ : U → U (where we write U for the universe
of types) makes possible. On the other hand, should A have only one inhabitant up to the
internal equality, this inhabitant can be constructed from an inhabitant of ‖A‖. This is
a crucial difference between propositional truncation and double negation. We consider a
weak version of ‖−‖ which does not have judgmental computation properties.
After discussing direct generalizations of Hedberg’s Theorem, we attempt to transfer
the results from the original setting, where they talk about equality types (of path spaces),
to arbitrary types. This leads to a broad discussion of weakly constant functions: we say
that f : A→ B is weakly constant if it maps any two elements of A to equal elements of B.
The attribute weakly comes from the fact that we do not require these actual equality proofs
to fulfil further conditions, and a weakly constant function does not necessarily appear to
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be constant in the topological models. For exactly this reason, it is in general not possible
to factor the function f through ‖A‖; however, we can do it in certain special cases, and
we analyze why. This has, for example, the consequence that the truncated sum of two
proposition already has the universal property of their join, which is defined as a higher
inductive type in homotopy type theory.
Particularly interesting are weakly constant endofunctions. We show that these can
always be factored through the propositional truncation, based on the observation that the
type of fixed points of such a function is a proposition. This allows us to define a new
notion of existence which we call populatedness. We say that A is populated if any weakly
constant endofunction on A has a fixed point. This property is propositional and behaves
very similar to ‖A‖, but we show that it is strictly weaker. On the other hand, it is strictly
stronger than the double negation ¬¬A, another notion of existence which, however, is often
not useful as it generally only allows to prove negative statements. It is worth emphasizing
that our populatedness is not a component that has to be added to type theory, but a notion
that can be defined internally. We strongly suspect that this is not the case for even the
weak version of propositional truncation, but we lack a formal proof.
It turns out to be interesting to consider the assumption that every type has a weakly
constant endofunction. The empty type has a trivial such endofunction, and so does a
type of which we know an explicit inhabitant; however, from the assumption that a type
has a weakly constant endofunction, we have no way of knowing in which case we are.
In a minimalistic theory, we do not think that this assumption implies excluded middle.
However, it implies that all equalities are decidable, i.e. a strong version of excluded middle
holds for equalities.
Finally, we show that the judgmental computation rule of the propositional truncation,
if it is assumed, does have some interesting consequences for the theory. One of our obser-
vations is that we can construct a term mystN such that mystN(|n|) is judgmentally equal
to n for any natural number n, which shows that the projection map |−| : N → ‖N‖ does
not loose meta-theoretic information, in a certain sense.
Some parts of the Sections 3, 4, 6 and 7 of this article have been published in our
previous conference paper [13].
Formalization. We have formalized [14] all of our results in the dependently typed pro-
gramming language and proof assistant Agda [19]. It is available in browser-viewable format
and as plain source code on the first-named author’s academic homepage. All proofs type-
check in Agda version 2.4.2.5.
As most of our results are internal statements in type theory, they can be formalized
directly in a readable way, understandable even for readers who do not have any experience
with the specific proof assistant or formalized proofs in general. We have tried our best and
would like to encourage the reader to have a look at the accompanying formalization.
Contents. In Section 2, we specify the type theory that we work in, a standard version
of Martin-Lo¨f type theory. We also state basic definitions, but we try to use standard
notation and we hope that all notions are as intuitive as possible. We then revisit Hed-
berg’s Theorem in Section 3 and formulate several generalizations. Next, we move on to
explore weakly constant functions between general types. We show that a weakly constant
endofunction has a propositional type of fixed points and factors through ‖−‖ in Section 4.
It is known that the factorization can not always be done for functions between different
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types, but we discuss some cases in which it is possible in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted
to populatedness, a new definable notion of anonymous existence in type theory, based on
our previous observations of weakly constant endofunctions. We examine the differences
between inhabitance, populatedness, propositional truncation and double negation, all of
which are notions of existence, carefully in Section 7. In particular, we show that if every
type has a weakly constant endofunction, then all equalities are decidable. Finally, Section 8
discusses consequences of the judgmental computation rule of propositional truncation, and
Section 9 presents a summary and questions which we do not know the answer to.
2. Preliminaries
Our setting is a standard version of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory (MLTT) with type
universes that have coproducts, dependent sums, dependent products and identity types.
We give a very rough specification of these constructions below. For a rigorous treatment, we
refer to our main reference [27, Appendix A.1 or A.2]. We use standard notation whenever
it is available. If it improves the readability, we allow ourselves to implicitely uncurry
functions and write f(x, y) instead of f(x)(y) or f x y.
Type Universes. MLTT usually comes equipped with a hierarchy U0,U1,U2, . . . of uni-
verses, where Un+1 is the type of Un. With very few exceptions, we only need one universe
U and therefore omit the index. U can be understood as a generic universe or, for simplicity,
as the lowest universe U0. If we say that X is a type, we mean X : U , possibly in some
context.
Coproducts. If X and Y are types, then so is X + Y . If we have x : X or y : Y , we get
inlx : X + Y or inr y : X + Y , respectively. To prove a statement for all elements in X + Y ,
it is enough to consider those that are of one of these two forms.
Dependent Pairs. If X is a type and Y : X → U a family of types, indexed over X,
then ΣXY is the corresponding dependent pair type, sometimes called a dependent sum or
just Σ-type. For x : X and y : Y (x), we have (x, y) : ΣXY , and to eliminate out of ΣXY , it
is enough to consider elements of this form. We prefer to write Σx:XY (x) instead of ΣXY ,
hoping to increase readability. Instead of Σx1:XΣx2:XY (x1, x2), we write Σx1,x2:XY (x1, x2).
In the special case that Y does not depend on X, it is standard to write X × Y .
Dependent Functions. Given X : U and Y : X → U as before, we have the type
ΠXY , called the dependent functions type or Π-type. It is sometimes also referred to as the
dependent product type, although that notion can be confusing as it would fit for Σ-types
as well. If, for any given x : X, the term t is an element in Y (x), we have λx.t : ΠXY .
Similarly to ΠXY , we write Πx:XY (x), and, if Y does not depend on X, we write X → Y .
Instead of Πx1:XΠx2:XY (x1, x2), we write Πx1,x2:XY (x1, x2).
Identity Types. Given a type X with elements x, y : X, we have the identity type or
the type of equalities, written x =X y. An inhabitant p : x =X y is thus called an equality,
an equality proof, or, having the interpretation of a type as a space in mind, a path from
x to y. Similarly, x =X y is called a path space. In the past, p often used to be called a
propositional equality. We avoid this terminology and reserve the word “propositional” for
types with at most one element, as explained in the introduction and in Definition 2.1.
The only introduction rule for the identity types is that, for any x : X, there is
reflx : x =X x. The elimination rule (called J ) says that, if P : (Σx,y:Xx =X y) → U
is a type family, it suffices to construct an inhabitant of Πx:XP (x, x, reflx) in order to get an
element of P (p) for any p : Σx,y:Xx =X y. We do explicitly not assume other elimination
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rules such as Streicher’s K or uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP) [24]. If the common type
of x, y can be inferred or is unimportant, we write x = y instead of x =X y.
In contrast to the identity type, definitional (also called judgmental) equality is a meta-
level concept. It refers to two terms, rather than two (hypothetical) elements, with the
same β (and, sometimes, η in a restricted sense) normal form. Recently, it has become
standard to use the symbol ≡ for judgmental equality in order to use = solely for the type
of equalities [27]. Note that the introduction rule of the latter says precisely that we have a
canonical equality proof for any two judgmentally equal terms, viewed as elements of some
type. For definitions, we use the notation :≡.
Applying the eliminator J is also referred to as path induction [27]. A variant of J that
is sometimes more useful is due to Paulin-Mohring [21]: given a point x : X and a type
family P : (Σy:Xx =X y)→ U , it is enough to construct an inhabitant of P (x, reflx) in order
to construct an inhabitant of P (y, q) for any pair (y, q). This elimination principle, called
based path induction, is equivalent to J.
As a basic example, we show that equality proofs satisfy the groupoid laws [7], where
reflexivity plays the role of identity morphisms. If we have p : x =X y and q : y =X z, we
can construct a path p q : x =X z (the composition of p and q): by based path induction, it
is enough to do this under the assumption that (z, q) : Σz:Xy =X z is (y, refly). But in that
case, the composition p  q is given by p. Similarly, for p : x =X y, there is p−1 : y =X x.
It is easy to see (again by path induction) that the types p  refly =X p and reflx  p =X p
as well as p  p−1 =X reflx are inhabited, and similarly, so are all the other types that are
required to give a type the structure of a groupoid.
An important special case of the eliminator J is substitution or transportation: if
P : X → U is a family of types and x, y : X are two elements (or points) that are equal
by p : x =X y, then an element of e : P (x) can be transported along the path p to get an
element of P (y), written
p∗(e) : P (y). (2.1)
Another useful function, similarly easily derived from J, is the following: if f : X → Y is a
function and p : x =X y a path, we get an inhabitant of f(x) = f(y) in Y ,
apfp : f(x) = f(y). (2.2)
Note that we omit the arguments x and y in the notation of apf .
Identity types also enable us to talk about isomorphism, or (better) equivalence, of
types. We say that X and Y are equivalent, written X ' Y , if there are functions in both
directions which are the inverses of each other,
f : X → Y (2.3)
g : Y → X (2.4)
p : Πx:Xg(f(x)) =X x (2.5)
q : Πy:Y f(g(y)) =Y y. (2.6)
Technically, (f, g, p, q) only constitute what is usually called a type isomorphism, but from
any such isomorphism, an equivalence (in the sense of homotopy type theory) can be con-
structed; and the only difference is that an equivalence requires a certain coherence between
the components p and q, which will not be important for us. In this sense, we do not dis-
tinguish between isomorphims and equivalences, and only choose the latter terminology
on principle. For details, we refer to [27, Chapter 4]. We call types logically equivalent,
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written X ⇔ Y , if there are functions in both directions (that is, we only have the compo-
nents (2.3) and (2.4)). We write X ⇔ Y ⇔ Z if X,Y, Z are pairwise logically equivalent,
and X ⇒ Y ⇒ Z as a shorthand notation for (X → Y )× (Y → Z).
Equivalent types share all internalizable properties. In fact, Voevodsky’s univalence
axiom (e.g. [27], [29]) has the consequence that equivalent types are equal. For the biggest
part of our article, we do not need to assume the univalence axiom; however, it will play
some role in Section 8.
We sometimes use other additional principles (namely function extensionality and
propositional truncation, as introduced later). However, we treat them as assumptions
rather than parts of the core theory and state clearly in which cases they are used.
In order to support the presentation from the next section on, we define a couple of
notions. Our hope is that all of these are as intuitive as possible, if not already known. The
only notion that is possibly ambiguous is weak constancy, meaning that a function maps
any pair of possible arguments to equal values.
Definition 2.1. We say that a type X is propositional, or is a proposition, if all its inhab-
itants are equal:
isPropX :≡ Πx,y:Xx = y. (2.7)
It is a well-known fact that the path spaces of a propositional type are not only inhabited
but also propositional themselves. This stronger property is called contractible,
isContrX :≡ X × isPropX. (2.8)
It is easy to see that any contractible type is equivalent to the unit type. An important well-
known lemma is that types are contractible if they are represented as singletons, sometimes
called path-to/path-from types: for any a0 : A, the type
Σa:Aa0 = a (2.9)
is contractible, as any inhabitant is by based path induction easily seen to be equal to
(a0, refla0).
Further, X satisfies UIP, or is a set, if its path spaces are all propositional:
isSetX :≡ Πx,y:X isProp(x = y). (2.10)
X is decidable if it is either inhabited or empty,
decidableX :≡ X + ¬X. (2.11)
We therefore say that X has decidable equality if the equality type of any two inhabitants
of X is decidable. Based on the terminology in [18], we also call a type with decidable
equality discrete:
isDiscreteX :≡ Πx,y:Xdecidable(x = y). (2.12)
A function (synonymously, map) f : X → Z is weakly constant, or 1-constant, if it
maps any two elements to the same inhabitant of Y :
wconst f :≡ Πx,y:Xf(x) = f(y). (2.13)
As weak (or 1-) constancy is the only notion of constancy that we consider in this article (if
we ignore factorizability through ‖−‖), we call such a function f just constant for simplicity.
However, note that this notion is indeed very weak as soon as we consider functions into
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types that are not sets, as we will see later. It will be interesting to consider the type of
constant endomaps on a given type:
constEndoX :≡ Σf :X→X wconst f. (2.14)
Finally, we may say that X has constant endomaps on all path spaces:
pathConstEndoX :≡ Πx,y:X constEndo (x = y). (2.15)
For some statements, but only if clearly indicated, we use function extensionality. This
principle says that two functions f, g of the same type ΠXY are equal as soon as they are
pointwise equal:
(Πx:Xf(x) = g(x))→ f = g. (2.16)
An important equivalent formulation due to Voevodsky [28] is that the type of propositions
is closed under Π; more precisely,
(Πx:X isProp (Y x)) → isProp (ΠXY ) . (2.17)
In the case of non-dependent functions, this means that X → Y is propositional as soon as
Y is.
A principle that we do not assume, but which will appear in some of our discussions,
is the law of excluded middle in the form for propositions and in the form for general types
[27, Chapter 3.4]. In the first form, it says that every proposition is decidable, while the
second says the the same without the restriction to propositions.
LEM :≡ ΠP :U (isPropP )→ P + ¬P (2.18)
LEM∞ :≡ ΠX:UX + ¬X. (2.19)
Note that LEM∞ can be considered the natural formulation under the Propositions-as-Types
view. However, the view that we adapt in this work (as in homotopy type theory) is the one
that only type-theoretical propositions in the sense of Definition 2.1 really represent math-
ematical propositions; general types carry more structure. In particular, LEM∞ includes
a very strong form of choice which is inconsistent with the univalence axiom of homotopy
type theory. Therefore, we consider LEM the “correct” formulation in our work.
We do not explicitly use this fact, but it may be helpful to note that, assuming function
extensionality, all of the above definitions that are called “is. . . ” (isPropX, isContrX,
isSetX, isDiscreteX) are propositional in the sense of Definition 2.1. For isPropX, isContrX,
isSetX, this is proved in [27, Theorem 7.1.10], and for isDiscreteX, this is a consequence of
Hedberg’s Theorem that we discuss in Section 3. It will also follow that pathConstEndoX is
propositional. The statements of LEM and (2.17) are propositional as well, while wconst f ,
constEndoX, (2.16), and LEM∞ are in general not propositional.
3. Hedberg’s Theorem
Before discussing possible generalizations, we want to state Hedberg’s Theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Hedberg [6]). Every discrete type satisfies UIP,
isDiscreteX → isSetX. (3.1)
We briefly give Hedberg’s original proof, consisting of two steps.
Lemma 3.2. If a type has decidable equality, its path spaces have constant endofunctions:
isDiscreteX → pathConstEndoX. (3.2)
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Proof. Given inhabitants x and y of X, we get by assumption either an inhabitant of x = y
or an inhabitant of ¬(x = y). In the first case, we construct the required constant function
(x = y)→ (x = y) by mapping everything to this given path. In the second case, we have
a proof of ¬(x = y), and the canonical function is constant automatically.
Lemma 3.3. If the path spaces of a type have constant endomaps, the type satisfies UIP:
pathConstEndoX → isSetX. (3.3)
Proof. Assume f is a parametrized constant endofunction on the path spaces, meaning that,
for any x, y : X, we have a constant function fx,y : x = y → x = y. Let p be a path from x
to y. We claim that
p = (fx,x(reflx))
−1  fx,y(p). (3.4)
By path induction, we only have to give a proof if the triple (x, y, p) is in fact (x, x, reflx),
in which case (3.4) is one of the groupoid laws that equality satisfies. Using the fact f is
constant on every path space, the right-hand side of the above equality is independent of
p, and in particular, equal to any other path of the same type.
Hedberg’s proof [6] is just the concatenation of the two lemmata. A slightly more direct
proof can be found in the HoTT Coq repository [26] and in a post by the first named author
on the HoTT blog [9].
Let us analyse the ingredients of the original proof. Lemma 3.2 uses the rather strong
assumption of decidable equality. In contrast, the assumption of Lemma 3.3 is logically
equivalent to its conclusion, so that there is no space for a strengthening. We include
a proof of this simple claim in Theorem 3.10 below and concentrate on weakening the
assumption of Lemma 3.3. Let us first introduce the notions of stability and separatedness.
Definition 3.4. For a type X, define
stableX :≡ ¬¬X → X, (3.5)
separatedX :≡ Πx,y:X stable(x = y). (3.6)
We can see stableX as a classical condition, similar to decidableX ≡ X + ¬X, but
strictly weaker. Indeed, we get a first strengthening of Hedberg’s Theorem as follows:
Lemma 3.5 ([27, Corollary 7.2.3]). Assuming function extensionality, any separated type
is a set,
separatedX → isSetX. (3.7)
Proof. There is, for any x, y : X, a canonical map (x = y)→ ¬¬(x = y). Composing this
map with the proof that X is separated yields an endofunction on the path spaces. With
function extensionality, the first map has a propositional codomain, implying that the en-
dofunction is constant and thereby fulfilling the requirements of Lemma 3.3.
We remark that full function extensionality is actually not needed here. Instead, a
weaker version that only works with the empty type is sufficient. Similar statements hold
true for all further applications of extensionality in this paper.
In a constructive setting, the question how to express that “there exists something”
in a type X is very subtle. One possibility is to ask for an inhabitant of X, but in many
cases, this is too strong to be fulfilled. A second possibility, which corresponds to our above
definition of separated, is to ask for a proof of ¬¬X. Then again, this is very weak, and
often too weak, as one can in general only prove negative statements from double-negated
assumptions.
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This fact has inspired the introduction of squash types (Constable [3]), and similar,
bracket types (Awodey and Bauer [1]). These lie in between of the two extremes mentioned
above. In our intensional setting, we talk of propositional truncations, or −1-truncations [27,
Chapter 3.7]. For any type X, we postulate that there is a type ‖X‖ that is a proposition,
representing the statement that X is inhabited. The rules are that if we have a proof of X,
we can, of course, get a proof of ‖X‖, and from ‖X‖, we can conclude the same statements
as we can conclude from X, but only if the actual representative of X does not matter:
Definition 3.6. We say that a type theory has weak propositional truncations if, for every
type X, we have a type ‖X‖ : U which satisfies the following properties:
(i) |−| : X → ‖X‖
(ii) htr : isProp(‖X‖)
(iii) rectr : ΠP :U isPropP → (X → P )→ ‖X‖ → P.
Note that this amounts to saying that the operator ‖−‖ is left adjoint to the inclusion
of the subcategory of propositions into the category of all types. Therefore, it can be seen
as the propositional reflection. For x, y : ‖X‖, we will write htrx,y for the proof of x =‖X‖ y
that we get from htr.
In contrast to other sources [27] we do not assume the judgmental β-rule
rectr(P, h, f, |x|) ≡β f(x) (3.8)
as it is simply not necessary for our results and we do not want to make the theory stronger
than required. This is the reason why we use the attribute weak. We do think that (3.8) is
often useful, but we also think it is interesting to make clear in which sense (3.8) makes the
theory actually stronger, rather than more convenient. We will discuss this in Section 8.
A practical advantage of not assuming (3.8) is that the truncation can be implemented in
existing proof assistants more easily. Of course, the β-rule holds propositionally as both
sides of the equation inhabit the same proposition.
Adopting the terminology of [27, Chapter 3.10], we say that X is merely inhabited if
‖X‖ is inhabited. We may also say that X merely holds. However, we try to always be
precise by giving the formal type expression to support the informal statement.
The non-dependent eliminator (or recursion principle, see [27, Chapter 5.1]) rectr lets
us construct the dependent one (the induction principle):
Lemma 3.7 (see [27, Exercise 3.17]). The propositional truncation admits the following
induction principle: Given a type X, a family P : ‖X‖ → U with h : Πz:‖X‖ isProp(P (z)),
a term f : Πx:XP (|x|) gives rise to an inhabitant of Πz:‖X‖P (z).
Proof. We have a map j : X → Σz:‖X‖P (z) by λx.(|x|, f(x)). Observe that the codomain
of j is a proposition, combining the fact that ‖X‖ is one with h. Therefore, we get
‖X‖ → Σz:‖X‖P (z), and this is sufficient, using that y =‖X‖ z for any y, z : ‖X‖.
In analogy to the notation rectr, we may write indtr for the term witnessing this induction
principle. However, most of our further developments will not require the induction principle
and will be proved with rectr.
Note that ‖−‖ is functorial in the sense that any function f : X → Y gives rise to a
function ‖f‖ : ‖X‖ → ‖Y ‖, although the proof of ‖g ◦ f‖ = ‖g‖ ◦ ‖f‖ requires function
extensionality. It is easy to see that ‖−‖ is a modality (an idempotent monad) in the sense
of [27, Chapter 7.7]. In particular, we have ‖‖X‖‖ ' ‖X‖.
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It is well-known that there is a type expression which is logically equivalent to the
propositional truncation:
Theorem 3.8. For any given X : U , we have the logical equivalence
‖X‖ ⇔ ΠP :U isPropP → (X → P )→ P. (3.9)
Under the assumption of function extensionality, the expression on the right-hand side
of (3.9) is propositional, and the logical equivalence (⇔) is thus an actual equivalence.
A potential problem with this expression is that it does not live in the universe U . This
size issue is the only thing that keeps us from using it as the definition for ‖X‖. All other
properties of the above Definition 3.6 are satisfied, at least under the assumption of function
extensionality. Voevodsky [28] suggests resizing rules to resolve the issue.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. The direction “→” of the statement is no more than a rearrangement
of the assumptions of property (iii) in the definition of ‖X‖. For the other direction, we
only need to instantiate P with ‖X‖ and observe that the properties (i) and (ii) are exactly
what is needed.
With this definition at hand, we can provide an even stronger variant of Hedberg’s
Theorem. Completely analogously to the notions of stability and separatedness, we define
what is means to say that a type has split support and is h-separated :
Definition 3.9. For a type X, define
splitSupX :≡ ‖X‖ → X, (3.10)
hSeparatedX :≡ Πx,y:X splitSup(x = y). (3.11)
We observe that hSeparatedX is a weaker condition than separatedX. Not only can
we conclude isSetX from hSeparatedX, but the converse holds as well. In the following
theorem, we also include the simple fact that having constant endomaps on path spaces is
equivalent to these statements.
Theorem 3.10. For a type X in MLTT with propositional truncation, the following are
equivalent:
(i) X is a set
(ii) X has constant endomaps on its path spaces
(iii) X is h-separated.
Further, each of the three types is propositional.
Proof. We first show the logical equivalence of the three types. “(ii) ⇒ (i)” is simply
Lemma 3.3. “(i) ⇒(iii)” uses simply the the definition of the propositional truncation:
given x, y : X, the fact that X is a set tells us exactly that x = y is propositional, implying
that we have a map ‖x = y‖ → (x = y). Concerning “(iii) ⇒ (ii)”, it is enough to observe
that the composition of |−| : (x = y)→ ‖x = y‖ and the map ‖x = y‖ → (x = y), provided
by the fact that X is h-separated, is a parametrized constant endofunction.
(i) is known to be a proposition. If (ii) or (iii) are inhabited, then X is a set, implying
that (ii) and (iii) are propositions.
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We observe that using propositional truncation in some cases makes it unnecessary to
appeal to functional extensionality. In Lemma 3.5, we have given a proof for the simple
statement that separated types are sets in the context of function extensionality. Let us now
drop function extensionality and assume instead that propositional truncation is available.
Every separated type is h-separated — more generally, we have
(¬¬X → X)→ (‖X‖ → X) (3.12)
for a type X — and every h-separated space is a set. Notice that ¬X → ¬‖X‖ and thus
also ‖X‖ → ¬¬X and (3.12) do not require function extensionality. Therefore, the mere
availability of propositional truncation suffices to solve a gap that function extensionality
would usually fill. In Section 8.2 below, we will see that propositional truncation with the
judgmental β-rule (3.8) makes it possible to derive function extensionality.
A variant of Theorem 3.10, more precisely of the direction “(iii) ⇒(i)”, can be for-
mulated without propositional truncation. We say that a reflexive propositionally-valued
relation on X is an R : X ×X → U such that R(x, y) is always propositional and R(x, x)
always contractible. If R implies identity, that is Πx,y:XR(x, y) → x = y, then X is a set.
This is a statement given in the standard text book on homotopy type theory [27, Theorem
7.2.2] and is sometimes called “Rijke’s Theorem”.
To conclude this part of the article, we want to mention that there is a slightly stronger
version of Hedberg’s Theorem which applies to types where equality might only be decidable
locally. In fact, nearly everything we stated or proved can be done locally, and thus made
stronger. In the proof of Lemma 3.2, we have not made use of the fact that we were
dealing with path spaces at all: any decidable type trivially has a constant endofunction.
Concerning Lemma 3.3, we observe:
Lemma 3.11 (Local form of Lemma 3.3). A type X that locally has constant endomaps on
path spaces does locally satisfy UIP. That means, for any x0 : X, we have
(Πy:X constEndo(x0 = y))→ Πy:X isProp(x0 = y). (3.13)
Proof. The proof is identical to the one of Lemma 3.3, with the only difference that we need
to apply based path induction instead of path induction.
This enables us to prove the local variant of Hedberg’s Theorem:
Theorem 3.12 ([20],[9]; Local form of Theorem 3.1). A locally discrete type X is locally a
set, i.e. for any x0 : X,
(Πy:Xdecidable(x0 = y))→ Πy:X isProp(x0 = y). (3.14)
In the same simple way, we immediately get that the assumption of local separatedness
is sufficient.
Lemma 3.13 (Local form of Lemma 3.5). Under the assumption of function extensionality,
a locally separated type locally is a set, i.e. for any x0 : X,
(Πy:X stable(x0 = y))→ Πy:X isProp(x0 = y). (3.15)
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Similarly, the local forms of the characterizations of Theorem 3.10 are still equivalent.
Theorem 3.14 (Local form of Theorem 3.10). For a type X in MLTT with propositional
truncation with a point x0 : X, the following are equivalent:
(i) for all y : X, the type x0 = y is propositional
(ii) for all y : X, the type x0 = y has a constant endomap
(iii) for all y : X, the type x0 = y has split support.
Note that most of our arguments can be generalized to higher truncation levels [27,
Chapter 7] in a reasonable and straightforward way. Details can be found in the first-
named author’s PhD thesis [12].
4. Split Support from Constant Endofunctions
If we unfold the definitions in the statements of Theorem 3.10, they all involve the path
spaces over some type X:
(i) Πx,y:X isProp(x = y)
(ii) Πx,y:X constEndo (x = y)
(iii) Πx,y:X splitSup(x = y).
We have proved that these statements are logically equivalent. It is a natural question to
ask whether this is true for types that are not necessarily path spaces. The possibilities that
path spaces offer are very powerful and we have used them heavily. Indeed, if we formulate
the above properties for an arbitrary type A instead of path types,
(i) isPropA
(ii) constEndoA
(iii) splitSupA,
we notice immediately that (i) is significantly and strictly stronger than the other two
properties. (i) says that A has at most one inhabitant, (ii) says that there is a constant
endofunction on A, and (iii) gives us a possibility to get an explicit inhabitant of A from
the proposition that A has an anonymous inhabitant. A propositional type has the other
two properties trivially, while the converse is not true. In fact, as soon as we know an
inhabitant a : A, we can very easily construct proofs of (ii) and (iii), while it does not help
at all with (i).
The implication (iii) ⇒ (ii) is also simple: if we have h : ‖A‖ → A, the composition
h◦|−| : A→ A is constant, as for any a, b : A, we have |a| = |b| and therefore h(|a|) = h(|b|).
In summary, we have (i) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (ii) and we know that the first implication cannot
be reversed. What is less clear is the reversibility of the second implication: If we have a
constant endofunction on A, can we get a map ‖A‖ → A? Put differently, what does it
take to get out of ‖A‖? Of course, a proof that A has split support is fine for that, but
does a constant endomap on A also suffice? Surprisingly, the answer is positive, and there
are interesting applications (Section 6). The main ingredient of our proof, and of much of
the rest of the paper, is the following crucial lemma about fixed points:
Lemma 4.1 (Fixed Point Lemma). Given a constant endomap f on a type X, the type of
its fixed points is propositional, where this type is defined by
fix f :≡ Σx:Xx = f(x). (4.1)
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Before we can give the proof, we first need to formulate two observations. Both of them
are simple on their own, but important insights for the Fixed Point Lemma. Let X and Y
be two types.
Auxiliary Lemma 4.2 ([27, Theorem 2.11.3]). Assume h, k : X → Y are two functions
and t : x = y as well as p : h(x) = k(x) are paths. Then, transporting along t into p can be
expressed as a composition of paths:
t∗(p) = (apht)
−1  p  apkt. (4.2)
Proof. This is immediate by path induction on t.
Even if the latter proof is trivial, the statement is essential. In the proof of Lemma 4.1,
we need a special case where x and y are the same. However, this special version cannot
be proved directly. We consider the second observation a key insight for the Fixed Point
Lemma:
Auxiliary Lemma 4.3. If f : X → Y is constant and x1, x2 : X are points, then
apf : x1 =X x2 → f(x1) =Y f(x2) is constant. In particular, apf maps every loop around
x (that is, path from x to x) to reflf(x).
Proof. If c is the proof of wconst f , then apf maps a path p : x = y to c(x, x)
−1  c(x, y).
This is easily seen to be correct for (x, x, reflx), which is enough to apply path induction.
As the expression is independent of p, the function apf is constant. The second part follows
from the fact that apf maps reflx to reflf(x).
With these lemmata at hand, we give a proof of the Fixed Point Lemma:
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Assume f : X → X is a function and c : wconst f is a proof that it is
constant. For any two pairs (x, p) and (x′, p′) : fix f , we need to construct a path connection
them.
First, we simplify the situation by showing that we can assume that x and x′ are the
same: By composing p : x = f x with c(x, x′) : f(x) = f(x′) and (p′)−1 : f(x′) = x′, we
get a path p′′ : x = x′. By a standard lemma [27, Theorem 2.7.2], a path between two
pairs corresponds to two paths: One path between the first components, and one between
the second, where transporting along the first path is needed. We therefore now get that
(x, (p′′)−1 p′) and (x′, p′) are equal: p′′ is a path between the first components, which makes
the second component trivial. Write q for the term (p′′)−1  p′.
We are now in the (nicer) situation that we have to construct a path between (x, p) and
(x, q) : fix f . Again, such a path can be constructed from two paths for the two components.
Let us assume that we use some path t : x = x for the first component. We then have to show
that t∗(p) equals q. In the situation with (x, p) and (x′, p′), it might have been tempting to
use p′′ as a path between the first components, and that would correspond to choosing reflx
for t. However, one quickly convinces oneself that this cannot work in the general case.
By Auxiliary Lemma 4.2, with the identity for h and f for k, the first of the two terms,
i. e. t∗(p), corresponds to t−1 p  apf t. With Auxiliary Lemma 4.3, that term can be further
simplified to t−1 p. What we have to prove is now just t−1 p = q, so let us just choose pq−1
for t, thereby making it into a straightforward application of the standard lemmata.
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A more elegant but possibly less revealing proof of the Fixed Point Lemma was given
by Christian Sattler:
Second Proof of Lemma 4.1 (Sattler). Given f : X → X and c : wconst f as before, assume
(x0, p0) : fix f . For any x : X, we have an equivalence of types,
f(x) = x ' f(x0) = x, (4.3)
given by precomposition with c(x0, x). Therefore, we also have the equivalence
Σx:Xf(x) = x ' Σx:Xf(x0) = x. (4.4)
The second of these types is a singleton and thus contractible, while the first is just fix f .
This shows that any other inhabitant of fix f is indeed equal to (x0, p0).
We will exploit Lemma 4.1 in different ways. For the following corollary note that,
given an endomap f on X with constancy proof c, we have a canonical projection
fst : fix f → X (4.5)
and a function
 : X → fix f (4.6)
(x) :≡ (f(x) , c(x, f(x))) . (4.7)
Corollary 4.4. In basic MLTT, for a type X with a constant endofunction f , the type fix f
is a proposition that is logically equivalent to X. In particular, fix f satisfies the conditions
(i)–(iii) of Definition 3.6. Therefore, for a type with a constant endomap, the weak propo-
sitional truncation is actually definable. If ‖−‖ is part of the theory, ‖X‖ and fix f are
equivalent, ‖X‖ ' fix f .
We are now in the position to prove the statement that we have announced at the
beginning of the section.
Theorem 4.5. A type X has a constant endomap if and only if it has split support in the
sense that ‖X‖ → X.
Proof. As already mentioned in earlier, the “if”-part is simple: given ‖X‖ → X, we just
need to compose it with |−| : X → ‖X‖ to get a constant endomap. The other direction is
an immediate consequence of Corollary 4.4.
We want to add the remark that constEndoX can be replaced by a seemingly weaker
assumption. The following statement (together with the Theorem 4.5) shows that it is
enough to have f : X → X which is merely constant:
Theorem 4.6. For a type X, the following are logically equivalent:
(i) X has a constant endomap
(ii) X has an endomap f with a proof ‖wconst f‖.
The first direction is trivial, but its reversibility is interesting. We do not think that
‖wconst f‖ allows us to construct an element of wconst f .
Proof of the nontrivial direction of Theorem 4.6. Assume f is an endofunction on X. From
Lemma 4.1, we know that
wconst f → isProp(fix f). (4.8)
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Using the recursion principle with the fact that the statement isProp(fix f) is a proposition
itself yields
‖wconst f‖ → isProp(fix f). (4.9)
Previously, we have constructed a map
wconst f → ‖X‖ → fix f. (4.10)
Let us write this function as
‖X‖ → wconst f → fix f. (4.11)
This makes it trivial to define a function
‖X‖ × ‖wconst f‖ → wconst f → fix f. (4.12)
We assume ‖X‖×‖wconst f‖. From (4.9), we conclude that fix f is a proposition. Therefore,
we may apply the recursion principle of the truncation and get
‖X‖ × ‖wconst f‖ → ‖wconst f‖ → fix f, (4.13)
which, of course, gives us
‖X‖ → fix f (4.14)
under the assumption (ii) of the theorem. Composing |−| with (4.14) and with the first
projection, we get a constant function g : X → X.
It seems to be impossible to show that the constructed function g is equal to f . On the
other hand, it is easy to prove the truncated version of this statement:
‖Πx:Xfx = gx‖. (4.15)
The detailed proof can be found in our formalization [14].
5. Factoring weakly constant Functions
In Theorem 4.5 we have seen that a type X with a constant function f : X → X always has
split support. In fact, what we have done is actually slightly more: the constructed map
f : ‖X‖ → X has the property that the triangle
X X
‖X‖
f
|−| f
commutes pointwise (in the sense that we have a family of equality proofs).
It seems a natural question to ask whether the fact that f is an endofunction is required:
given a (weakly) constant function f : X → Y , can it be factored in this sense through
‖X‖? With Theorem 4.5 in mind, it may be surprising that the answer is negative. In the
presence of univalence, Shulman has constructed a family of weakly constant functions such
that it is impossible that all of them factor [23]. From another result by the first-named
author, it follows that functions ‖X‖ → Y can be constructed from coherently constant
functions X → Y , where the proof of weak constancy comes with a tower of coherence
conditions [11]. However, there are special cases in which the factorization is possible only
assuming weak constancy, and some of these are discussed in the current section.
Let us start by giving a precise definition.
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Definition 5.1. Given a function f : X → Y between two types, we say that f factors
through a type Z if there are functions f1 : X → Z and f2 : Z → Y such that
Πx:X f2(f1(x)) =Y f(x). (5.1)
In particular, we say that f factors through ‖X‖ if there is a function f : ‖X‖ → Y such
that
Πx:X f(|x|) =Y f(x). (5.2)
As we will discuss later, assuming judgmental computation for ‖−‖, a factorization in
the above sense allows us to construct a judgmental factorization (see Section 8).
A related known result is that any function f : X → Y factors through its image (see
[27, Chapter 7.6]), where the image im(f) is defined as
im(f) :≡ Σy:Y ‖Σx:Xf(x) =Y y‖. (5.3)
If im(f) is propositional, this answers positively the question that we want to discuss. We
will see that this is what happens if Y is a set and f is constant (Theorem 5.4). However,
in general, im(f) is not necessarily propositional even if f is constant: One can check easily
that Y is a set if and only if all the functions 1→ X have a propositional image (which of
course means that all those images are contractible).
Constructing a function out of the propositional truncation of a type is somewhat
tricky. A well-known [27, Chapter 3.9] strategy for defining a map ‖X‖ → Y is to construct
a proposition P together with functions X → P and P → Y . We have already implicitly
done this in previous sections. We can make this method slightly more convenient to use if
we observe that P does not need to be a proposition, but it only needs to be a proposition
under the assumption that X is inhabited:
Principle 5.2. Let X,Y be two types. Assume P is a type such that P → Y . If X implies
that P is contractible, then there is a function ‖X‖ → Y . In particular, if f : X → Y is a
function that factors through P , then f factors through ‖X‖.
Let us briefly justify this principle. Assume that P has the assumed property. Utilizing
that the statement that P is contractible is propositional itself, we see that ‖X‖ is sufficient
to conclude that P is a proposition. This allows us to prove ‖X‖ × P to be propositional.
The map P → Y clearly gives rise to a map ‖X‖ × P → Y , and the map X → ‖X‖ × P is
given by |−| and the fact that P is contractible under the assumption X.
There are several situations in which this principle can be applied. The following
theorem does not need it as it is mostly a restatement of our previous result from Section 4.
Theorem 5.3. A weakly constant function f : X → Y factors through ‖X‖ in any one of
the following cases, of which the equivalent (iii) and (iv) generalize all others:
(i) X is empty, i.e. X → 0
(ii) X is inhabited, i.e. 1→ X
(iii) X has split support, i.e. ‖X‖ → X
(iv) X has a weakly constant endofunction, i.e. Σf :X→X wconst f
(v) we have any function g : Y → X.
Proof. Each of (i) and (ii) let us conclude (iii). Further, (v) gives us (iv) as the composition
g◦f is a constant endofunction on X. The logical equivalence of (iii) and (iv) is Theorem 4.5.
Thus, it is sufficient to prove the statement for (iii), so assume s : ‖X‖ → X. The required
conclusion is then immediate as f is pointwise equal to the composition of |−| : X → ‖X‖
and f ◦ s.
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Our next statement implies what we mentioned at the beginning of Section 5: under
the assumption of unique identity proofs, the factorization is always possible.
Theorem 5.4. Let X,Y be again two types and f : X → Y a constant function. If Y is a
set, then f factors through ‖X‖.
Proof. The crucial observation is that the image of f is propositional in the considered case.
In detail, we proceed as follows. We define P to be the image of f , that is,
P :≡ Σy:Y ‖Σx:Xf(x) =Y y‖. (5.4)
In order to apply Principle 5.2, we need to know that f factors through P . This is obvious
from the following diagram:
X Y
P
f
λx.(f(x),
∣∣x, reflf(x)∣∣) fst
We need to prove that P is propositional. That is, given two elements (y1, p1) and (y2, p2)
in P , we want to show that they are equal. Let us once more construct the equality via
giving a pair of paths. For the second component, there is nothing to do as p1 and p2 live
in propositional types. To show y1 =Y y2, observe that this type is propositional as Y is
a set and we may thus assume that we have inhabitants (x1, q1) : Σx1:Xf(x1) =Y y1 and
(x2, q2) : Σx2:Xf(x2) =Y y2 instead of p1 and p2. But f(x1) = f(x2) by constancy, and
therefore y1 = y2. The maps X → P and P → Y are the obvious ones and the claim
follows by Principle 5.2 (or rather the preceding comment, the strengthened version is not
needed).
It is not hard to see that, assuming function extensionality, the implication of Theo-
rem 5.4 gives rise to an equivalence
(Σf :X→Y wconst f) ' (‖X‖ → Y ) , (5.5)
where we use in particular that wconst f is propositional under the given conditions. This
is the simplest non-trivial special case of the result that functions ‖X‖ → Y correspond to
coherently constant functions X → Y [11].
Our last example of a special case in which the factorization can be done is more
involved. However, it is worth the effort as it provides valuable intuition and an interesting
application, as we will discuss below. The proof we give benefits hugely from a simplification
by Sattler who showed to us how reasoning with type equivalences can be applied here.
Theorem 5.5. Assume that function extensionality holds. If f : X → Y is constant and
X is the coproduct of two propositions, then f factors through ‖X‖.
Proof. Assume X ≡ Q+R, where Q and R are propositions, and assume that c : wconst f
is the witness of constancy. Define P to be the following Σ-type with four components:
P :≡ Σ (y : Y )
Σ (s : Πq:Q y = f(inl q))
Σ (t : Πr:R y = f(inr r))(
Πq:QΠr:R s(q)
−1  t(r) = c(inl q , inr r)
) (5.6)
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In order to apply Principle 5.2 we need to construct a function P → Y and a proof that
X implies that P is contractible.
The function P → Y is, of course, given by a simple projection. For the other part,
let a point of X be given. Without loss of generality, we assume that this inhabitant is
inl q0 with q0 : Q. It would be possible to construct a point in P and show that this point
is equal to any other point. However, constructing a chain of equivalences yields a more
elegant proof. This strategy was proposed to us by Christian Sattler.
As Q is contractible with center q0, it suffices to only consider q0 instead of quantifying
over all elements of Q. Applying this twice shows that P is equivalent to the following type:
Σ (y : Y )
Σ (s : y = f(inl q0))
Σ (t : Πr:R y = f(inr r))(
Πr:R s
−1  t(r) = c(inl q0 , inr r)
)
.
(5.7)
The first two Σ-components together have the shape of a singleton, showing that this part
is contractible with the canonical inhabitant (f(inl q0), refl). We may thus remove these
Σ-components (see [27, Theorem 3.11.9 (ii)]) and the above type further simplifies to
Σ (t : Πr:R f(inl q0) = f(inr r))(
Πr:R refl
−1  t(r) = c(inl q0 , inr r)
)
.
(5.8)
We apply the distributivity principle of Π and Σ (see [27, Theorem 2.15.7]), together with
standard simplifications, to further simplify to
Πr:RΣ (t : f(inl q0) =B f(inr r))
(t = c(inl q0 , inr r)) .
(5.9)
For any r : R, the dependent pair part is contractible as it is, once more, a singleton, and
function extensionality allows us to conclude the stated result.
Theorem 5.5 was inspired by a discussion on the homotopy type theory mailing list [25].
Shulman observed that, for two propositions Q and R, their join Q ∗ R [27, Chapter 6.8],
defined as the (homotopy) pushout of the diagram Q
fst←− Q × R snd−−→ R, is equivalent to
‖Q+R‖. This means that, in the presence of higher inductive types [27, Chapter 6], the type
‖Q+R‖ has the (seemingly) stronger elimination rule of the join. The second named author
then asked whether higher inductive types do really improve the elimination properties of
‖Q+R‖ in this sense. This was discussed shortly before we could answer the question
negatively with the result of Theorem 5.5: its statement about ‖Q+R‖ corresponds exactly
to the elimination property of Q ∗R. Thus, the join of two propositions already exists in a
minimalistic setting that involves truncation but no other higher inductive types.
6. Populatedness
In this section we discuss a notion of anonymous existence, similar to, but weaker (see Sec-
tion 7.2) than propositional truncation. It crucially depends on the Fixed Point Lemma 4.1.
Let us start by discussing another perspective on what we have explained in Section 4.
Trivially, for a type X, we can prove the statement
‖X‖ → (‖X‖ → X)→ X. (6.1)
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By Lemma 4.5, this is equivalent to
‖X‖ → constEndoX → X, (6.2)
and hence
constEndoX → ‖X‖ → X, (6.3)
which can be read as: If we have a constant endomap on X and we wish to get an inhabitant
of X (or, equivalently, a fixed point of the endomap), then ‖X‖ is sufficient to do so. We
can additionally ask whether it is also necessary: can we replace the first assumption ‖X‖
by something weaker? Looking at formula 6.1, it would be natural to conjecture that this
is not the case, but it is. In this section, we discuss what it can be replaced by, and in
Section 7.2, we give a proof that it is indeed weaker.
For answering the question what is needed to get from splitSupX to X, let us define
the following notion:
Definition 6.1 (populatedness). For a given type X, we say that X is populated, writ-
ten 〈〈X〉〉, if every constant endomap on X has a fixed point:
〈〈X〉〉 :≡ Πf :X→X wconst f → fix f, (6.4)
where fix f is the type of fixed points, defined as in Lemma 4.1.
The notion of populatedness (which, to add a caveat, is not functorial; see Theorem 7.7)
allows us to comment on the question raised above. If 〈〈X〉〉 has an element and X has a
constant endomap, then X has an inhabitant, as such an inhabitant can be extracted from
the type of fixed points by projection. Hence, 〈〈X〉〉 instead of ‖X‖ in 6.3 would be sufficient
as well. Therefore,
〈〈X〉〉 → (‖X‖ → X)→ X. (6.5)
At this point, we have to ask ourselves whether (6.5) is an improvement over (6.3). But
indeed, we have the following property:
Theorem 6.2. Any merely inhabited type is populated. That is, for a type X, we have
‖X‖ → 〈〈X〉〉. (6.6)
Proof. Assume f is a constant endofunction on X. The claim follows directly from Corol-
lary 4.4.
In Section 7 we will see that 〈〈X〉〉 is in fact strictly weaker than ‖X‖.
In the presence of propositional truncation, we can give an alternative characterization
of populatedness. Recall that we indicate propositional truncation with the attribute merely.
Lemma 6.3. In MLTT with propositional truncation, a type is populated if and only if the
statement that it merely has split support implies that it is merely inhabited, or equivalently,
if and only if the statement that X has split support allows the construction of an element
of X. Formally, the following types are logically equivalent:
(i) 〈〈X〉〉
(ii)
∥∥‖X‖ → X∥∥ → ‖X‖
(iii) (‖X‖ → X)→ X.
Proof. We have already discussed (i) ⇒ (iii) above, see (6.5). (iii) ⇒ (ii) follows from
the functoriality of the truncation operator. For (ii) ⇒ (i), assume we have a constant
endofunction f on X. Hence, we have a function ‖X‖ → X, thus ∥∥‖X‖ → X∥∥ and, by
assumption, ‖X‖. But ‖X‖ is enough to construct a fixed point of f by Corollary 4.4.
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A nice feature of the notion of populatedness is that it is definable in MLTT, and it
can thus be used without making further assumptions. For the rest of this section, let
us explicitly not assume that the type theory has propositional truncations. We can give
one more characterization of populatedness, and a strong parallel to mere inhabitance, as
follows:
Theorem 6.4. In MLTT, a type X is populated if and only if any proposition that is
logically equivalent to it holds,
〈〈X〉〉 ⇔ ΠP :U isPropP → (P → X)→ (X → P )→ P. (6.7)
Note that the only difference to the type expression in Theorem 3.8 is that we only
quantify over sub-propositions of X, i. e. over those that satisfy P → X, while we quantify
over all propositions in the case of ‖X‖. This again shows that ‖X‖, if it exists, is at least
as strong as 〈〈X〉〉.
Proof. Let us first prove the direction “→”. Assume a proposition P is given, together
with functions X → P and P → X. Composition of these gives us a constant endomap on
X, exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.10. But then 〈〈X〉〉 makes sure that this constant
endomap has a fixed point, which is (or allows us to extract) an inhabitant of X. Using
X → P again, we get P .
For the direction “←”, assume we have a constant endomap f . We need to construct
an inhabitant of fix f . In the expression on the right-hand side, choose P to be fix f , and
everything follows from Corollary 4.4.
The similarities between ‖X‖ and 〈〈X〉〉 do not stop here. The following statement, to-
gether with the direction “→” of the theorem that we have just proved, should be compared
to the definition of ‖X‖ (that is, Definition 3.6):
Theorem 6.5. For any X, the type 〈〈X〉〉 has the following properties:
(i) X → 〈〈X〉〉
(ii) isProp(〈〈X〉〉) (if function extensionality holds).
Proof. The first point can be shown using the map  as defined in (4.7). For the second,
we use that fix f is a proposition (Lemma 4.1). By function extensionality, a (dependent)
function type is propositional if the codomain is (see Section 2) and we are done.
The following result, shown without using propositional truncation, is the analog to
Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 6.6. Let X be a type. If we have a constant endomap on X, then (〈〈X〉〉 → X).
Assuming function extensionality, this implication can be reversed. If X is propositional,
then constEndoX and (〈〈X〉〉 → X) are both inhabited (not requiring function extensional-
ity).
Proof. Given a constant endofunction f on X, an inhabitant of 〈〈X〉〉 gives us fix f and thus
X by projection. For the other direction, if we have (〈〈X〉〉 → X), then the composition
with (Theorem 6.5.(i)) gives a constant endofunction on X. If X is propositional, then the
identity is clearly constant.
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As remarked above, ‖−‖ is an idempotent monad in an appropriate sense, while 〈〈−〉〉
is not even functorial (see Theorem 7.7). However, we do have the following:
Theorem 6.7. Assuming function extensionality, the notion of populatedness is idempotent
in the sense that, for a type X, we have an equivalence
〈〈〈〈X〉〉〉〉 ' 〈〈X〉〉. (6.8)
Proof. Theorem 6.5 shows that both sides are propositional and that there is a map “←”.
A map “→” is given by Theorem 6.6.
7. Taboos and Counter-Models
In this section we look at the differences between the various notions of (anonymous) in-
habitance we have encountered. We have, for a type X, the following chain of implications:
X ⇒ ‖X‖ ⇒ 〈〈X〉〉 ⇒ ¬¬X. (7.1)
The first implication is trivial and the second is given by Theorem 6.2. Maybe somewhat
surprisingly, the last implication does not require function extensionality, as we do not need
to prove that ¬¬X is propositional: to show
〈〈X〉〉 → ¬¬X , (7.2)
let us assume f : ¬X. But then, f can be composed with the unique function from the
empty type into X, yielding a constant endomap on X, and obviously, this function cannot
have a fixed point in the presence of f . Therefore, the assumption of 〈〈X〉〉 would lead to a
contradiction, as required.
Under the assumption of LEM, all implications of the chain (7.1) except the first can
be reversed as it is easy to show
ΠX:U (‖X‖ + ¬‖X‖)→ ¬¬X → ‖X‖. (7.3)
Constructively, none of the implications of (7.1) should be reversible. To make that precise,
we use what we call taboos, showing that the provability of a statement would imply the
provability of another better understood statement which is known to be not provable. A
taboo is essentially a type-theoretic Brouwerian counterexample (“constructive taboo”) or
a homotopical analog (“homotopical taboo”).
In this section, we present the following discussions:
(i) We start by assuming that the first implication can be reversed, i.e. that we have
a function ΠX:U‖X‖ → X. It is easy to see that this assumption implies that all
types are sets. We show the more interesting result that all equalities are decidable.
As an additional argument, if every type has split support, a form of choice that
does not belong to type theory is implied. Moreover, we observe that ‖X‖ → X
can be read as “the map |−| : X → ‖X‖ is a split epimorphism” (where the latter
notion must be read with care), and we show that already the weaker assumption
that it is an epimorphism implies that all types are sets.
(ii) It would be nice if the second implication could be reversed, as this would imply that
propositional truncation is definable in MLTT. However, this is logically equivalent
to a certain weak version of the axiom of choice discussed below, which is not
provable (but holds under LEM).
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(iii) Assuming function extensionality, the last implication can be reversed if and only if
LEM holds.
7.1. Inhabited and Merely Inhabited. We first examine the question whether the first
part of the chain (7.1) can be reversed. If X is a type, it is weaker to have an inhabitant
of ‖X‖ than to have an inhabitant of X. It is unreasonable to expect that we can show
in type theory that every type has split support, but it is interesting to see what it would
imply.
First of all, if we assume that all types have split support, then this in particular holds
for path spaces, and by Theorem 3.10, every type is a set. This assumption also implies the
axiom of choice [27, Chapter 3.8]. If we have univalence for propositions and set quotients,
this allows us to use Diaconescu’s proof of LEM ([4], see [27, Theorem 10.1.14]). We want
to present a similar construction in the much more minimalistic theory that we consider in
the current article.
Using Theorem 4.5, we can formulate the assumption that all types have split support
without using truncations as “every type has a constant endofunction”,
ΠX:U constEndoX. (7.4)
From a constructive point of view, this is an interesting assumption. It clearly follows
from LEM∞: if we know an inhabitant of a type, we can immediately construct a constant
endomap, and for the empty type, considering the identity function is sufficient. The
assumption (7.4) contains some form of choice, but we do not expect that the general
principle LEM∞ can be derived in our setting. Hence, we may understand (7.4) as a weak
form of LEM∞. However, what we can derive is LEM∞ for all path spaces, i.e. that all types
are discrete, see Lemma 7.1 and Theorem 7.2 below.
Lemma 7.1. In basic MLTT (without function extensionality and without propositional
truncations), let A be a type and a0, a1 : A two points. If the type (a0 = x) + (a1 = x) has
a constant endomap for all x : A , then a0 = a1 is decidable.
As we will see in the proof, we need to know 02 6=2 12 for Lemma 7.1, which can be
proved using a universe. If we assume 02 6=2 12, the lemma is true in an even weaker setting
without a type universe. Before giving the proof of Lemma 7.1, we state an immediate
corollary:
Theorem 7.2. If every type has a constant endofunction then every type has decidable
equality,
(ΠX:U constEndoX)→ ΠX:U isDiscreteX. (7.5)
Proof of Lemma 7.1. For (technical and conceptual) convenience, we regard the elements
a0, a1 as a single map
a : 2→ A (7.6)
and we use
Ex :≡ Σi:2 ai = x (7.7)
in place of the type (a0 = x) + (a1 = x). In a theory with propositional truncation, the
image of a can be defined to be Σx:A‖Ex‖ [27, Definition 7.6.3]. By assumption, we have a
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family of constant endofunctions fx on Ex, and by the discussion above, we can essentially
regard the type
E :≡ Σx:A fix fx, (7.8)
which can be unfolded to
Σx:AΣ(i,p):Exfx(i, p) = (i, p), (7.9)
as the image of a. It is essentially the observation that we can define this image that allows
us to mimic Diaconescu’s argument. Recall from (4.7) that  is the canonical function that
maps a point of a type to a fixed point of a given endofunction on that type. Clearly, a
induces a map
r : 2→ E (7.10)
r(i) :≡ (ai, (i, reflai)). (7.11)
Using that the second component is an inhabitant of a proposition, we have
r(i) = r(j) ⇔ ai = aj . (7.12)
The type E can be understood as the quotient of 2 by the equivalence relation ∼, given by
i ∼ j ≡ ai = aj . If E was the image of a in the ordinary sense [27, Definition 7.6.3], the
axiom of choice would be necessary to find a section of r (see [27, Theorem 10.1.14]). In
our situation, this section is given by a simple projection,
s : E → 2 (7.13)
s(x, ((i, p), q)) :≡ i. (7.14)
It is easy to see that s is indeed a section of r in the sense of Πe:Er(s(e)) = e. Given
(x, ((i, p), q)) : E, applying first s, then r leads to (ai, (i, reflai)). Equality of these expres-
sions is equality of the first components due to the propositional second component. But p
is a proof of ai = x. From that property, we can conclude that, for any e0, e1 : E,
e0 = e1 ⇔ s(e0) = s(e1). (7.15)
Combining (7.12) and (7.15) yields
ai = aj ⇔ s(r(i)) = s(r(j)), (7.16)
where the right-hand side is an equality in 2 and thus always decidable. In particular,
a0 = a1 is hence decidable.
Another consequence of the assumption (7.4) is a form of choice that does not belong to
intuitionistic type theory. In order to formulate and prove this, we need a few definitions.
We say that a relation R : X ×X → U is propositionally valued if
Πx,y:X isProp(R(x, y)). (7.17)
The R-image of a point x : X is
Rx :≡ Σy:XR(x, y). (7.18)
We say that R is functional if its point-images are all propositions:
Πx:X isPropRx. (7.19)
We say that two relations R,S : X ×X → U have the same domain if
Πx:XRx ⇔ Sx, (7.20)
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and that S is a subrelation of R if
Πx,y:XS(x, y)→ R(x, y). (7.21)
Theorem 7.3. If all types have constant endofunctions, then every binary relation has a
functional, propositionally valued subrelation with the same domain.
Proof. Assume that R : X ×X → U is given. For x : X, let kx : Rx → Rx be the constant
map given by the assumption (7.4) that all types have constant endofunctions. Define
further
S(x, y) :≡ Σa:R(x,y)(y, a) = kx(y, a). (7.22)
Then S is a subrelation of R by construction. We observe that Sx is equivalent to fix(kx)
and therefore propositional (by Lemma 4.1), proving that S is functional. Together with
Corollary 4.4, this further shows
Rx ⇔ fix kx ⇔ Sx, (7.23)
showing that R and S have the same domain.
What remains to show is that S(x, y) is always a proposition. Let s, s′ : S(x, y). As Sx
is propositional we know (y, s) =Sx (y, s
′). By the standard lemma this type corresponds
to a dependent pair type with components
p : y =X y (7.24)
q : p∗(s) =S(x,y) s′. (7.25)
In our case, as every type is a set, we have p = refly, and q gives us the required proof of
s =S(x,y) s
′.
Instead of the logically equivalent formulation (7.4), let us now assume the original
assumption that |−| can be reversed, that is,
ΠX:U‖X‖ → X. (7.26)
Note that a map h : ‖X‖ → X is automatically a section of |−| : X → ‖X‖ in the sense of
Πz:‖X‖ |h(z)| = z (7.27)
as any two inhabitants of ‖X‖ are equal. Therefore, we may read (7.26) as:
For any type X, the map |−| : X → ‖X‖ is a split epimorphism. (7.28)
We want to consider a weaker assumption, namely
For any type X, the map |−| : X → ‖X‖ is an epimorphism, (7.29)
where we call e : U → V an epimorphism if, for any type W and any two functions
f, g : V →W , we have
(Πu:Uf(e u) = g(e u))→ Πv:V f v = g v. (7.30)
Of course, under function extensionality, e is an epimorphism if and only if, for all W, f, g,
we have
f ◦ e = g ◦ e→ f = g. (7.31)
A caveat is required. Our definition of epimorphism is the direct naive translation of the
usual 1-categorical notion into type theory. However, the category of types and functions
with the type of equalities is not only an ordinary category, but rather an (∞, 1)-category.
The definition (7.30) makes sense in the category of sets [27, Chapter 10.1], where equalities
are propositional. However, the property of being an epimorphism in our sense is not
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propositional and it could rightfully be argued that it might not be the “correct” definition
in a context where not every type is a set, similarly to how we argued that LEM∞ is a
problematic version of the principle of excluded middle. Despite this, we use the notion as
we think that it helps providing an intuitive meaning to the plain type expression (7.30).
Lemma 7.4. Let Y be a type. If the map |−| : (y1 = y2) → ‖y1 = y2‖ is an epimorphism
for any points y1, y2 : Y , then Y is a set.
Proof. Assume Y, y1, y2 are given. Define two functions
f, g : ‖y1 = y2‖ → Y (7.32)
by
f(q) :≡ y1, (7.33)
g(q) :≡ y2, (7.34)
that is, f and g are constant at y1 and y2, respectively.
With these concrete choices, our assumption (7.30) with e ≡ |−| becomes
(y1 = y2 → y1 = y2)→ (‖y1 = y2‖ → y1 = y2) (7.35)
which, of course, gives us a function
‖y1 = y2‖ → y1 = y2. (7.36)
The statement of the lemma then follows from Theorem 3.10.
The following result summarizes the statements of Theorem 7.2 and Lemma 7.4:
Theorem 7.5. In basic MLTT with weak propositional truncation,
(i) if |−| : X → ‖X‖ is a split epimorphism for every X, then all types have decidable
equality
(ii) if |−| : X → ‖X‖ is an epimorphism for every X, then all types are sets.
Proof. The first part is a reformulation of Theorem 7.2, while the second part is a corollary
of Lemma 7.4.
7.2. Merely Inhabited and Populated. Assume that the second step in (7.1) can be
reversed, meaning that we have
ΠX:U 〈〈X〉〉 → ‖X‖. (7.37)
Repeated use of the Fixed Point Lemma leads to a couple of interesting logically equivalent
statements.
In the previous subsection, we have discussed that we cannot show that every type has
split support. However, a weaker version of this is provable:
Lemma 7.6. For every type X, the statement that it has split support is populated,
〈〈‖X‖ → X〉〉. (7.38)
To demonstrate the different possibilities that the logically equivalent formulations of
populatedness offer, we want to give more than one proof. The first one uses Definition 6.1:
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First proof. Assume we are given a constant endofunction f on ‖X‖ → X. We need
to construct a fixed point of f , or correspondingly, any inhabitant of ‖X‖ → X. By
Theorem 4.5, a constant function g : X → X is enough for this. Given x : X, we may apply
f to the function that is everywhere x, yielding an inhabitant of ‖X‖ → X. Applying it to
|x| gives an element of X, and we define g(x) to be this element. The proof that that f is
constant immediately translates to a proof that g is constant.
Alternatively, we can use the logically equivalent formulation of populatedness, proved
in Theorem 6.4:
Second proof. Assume P is a proposition and we have a proof of
P ⇔ (‖X‖ → X). (7.39)
We need to show P . The logical equivalence above immediately provides an inhabitant of
X → P , and, by the rules of the propositional truncation, therefore ‖X‖ → P . Assume
‖X‖. We get P , thus ‖X‖ → X with the above equivalence, and therefore X (using the
assumed ‖X‖ again). This shows ‖X‖ → X, and consequently, P .
Finally, we can also use that 〈〈−〉〉 can be written in terms of ‖−‖:
Third proof. Using Lemma 6.3(iii), the statement that needs to be shown becomes(∥∥‖X‖ → X∥∥ → ‖X‖ → X)→ (‖X‖ → X) , (7.40)
which is immediate.
The assumption that populatedness and mere inhabitance are equivalent has a couple
of “suspicious” consequences, as we want to show now.
Theorem 7.7. In MLTT with weak propositional truncation, the following are logically
equivalent:
(i) every populated type is merely inhabited,
ΠX:U 〈〈X〉〉 → ‖X‖ (7.41)
(ii) every type merely has split support,
ΠX:U
∥∥‖X‖ → X∥∥ (7.42)
(iii) every proposition is projective in the following sense:
ΠP :U isPropP → ΠY :P→U (Πp:P ‖Y (p)‖)→ ‖ΠPY ‖ (7.43)
(note that this is the axiom of choice [27, Chapter 3.8] for propositions, without the
requirement that Y is a family of sets)
(iv) 〈〈−〉〉 : U → U is functorial in the sense that
ΠX,Y :U (X → Y )→ (〈〈X〉〉 → 〈〈Y 〉〉), (7.44)
where this naming is justified at least in the presence of function extensionality which
implies that 〈〈X〉〉 → 〈〈Y 〉〉 is propositional, ensuring 〈〈g ◦ f〉〉 = 〈〈g〉〉 ◦ 〈〈f〉〉.
Further, (iv) can be formulated in MLTT without assumptions on the availability of propo-
sitional truncation. If it holds, then 〈〈−〉〉 satisfies the recursion principle of the weak propo-
sitional truncation. Additionally assuming function extensionality, 〈〈−〉〉 can then serve as
an implementation of the weak propositional truncation.
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Proof. Let us first show the final claim. If Y is propositional, then 〈〈Y 〉〉 → Y by Theo-
rem 6.6. Together with (iv), this gives the claimed recursion principle. The rest of the
properties of the weak propositional truncation is given by Theorem 6.5.
Let us show the logical equivalence of the four types. The above observation immedi-
ately implies (iv) ⇒ (i). The direction (i) ⇒ (iv) is also immediate by functoriality of ‖−‖.
The logical equivalence of the first two points follows easily from what we already know.
(i) ⇒ (ii) is an application of Lemma 7.6, while (ii) ⇒ (i) follows from Lemma 6.3.
Let us now show (i) ⇒ (iii). Let P be some proposition and Y : P → U some family of
types. If we assume (i), it is then enough to prove
(Πp:P ‖Y (p)‖)→ 〈〈ΠPY 〉〉. (7.45)
By Lemma 6.3, it is enough to show
(Πp:P ‖Y (p)‖)→ (‖ΠPY ‖ → ΠPY )→ ΠPY. (7.46)
Under several assumptions, one of them being that some p0 : P is given, we need to
construct an inhabitant of Y (p0). Recall the principle of the neutral contractible exponent
that we used in the proof of Theorem 5.5. Here, it allows us to replace ΠPY by Y (p0) and
Πp:P ‖Y (p)‖ by ‖Y (p0)‖, and the type (7.46) becomes
‖Y (p0)‖ → (‖Y (p0)‖ → Y (p0))→ Y (p0), (7.47)
which is obvious.
(iii) ⇒ (ii) can be seen easily by taking P to be ‖X‖ and Y to be constantly X.
Consider the third of the four statements in Theorem 7.7. When Y (p) is a set with
exactly two elements for every p : P , this amounts to the world’s simplest axiom of choice [5],
which fails in some toposes. We expect that this makes it possible to show that, in MLTT
with weak propositional truncation, ΠX:U 〈〈X〉〉 → ‖X‖ is not derivable.
7.3. Populated and Non-Empty. If we can reverse the last implication of the chain, we
have
ΠX:U¬¬X → 〈〈X〉〉. (7.48)
To show that this cannot be provable, we show that it is equivalent to LEM, a constructive
taboo.
Theorem 7.8. With function extensionality, we have the following (logical) equivalence:
(ΠX:U¬¬X → 〈〈X〉〉) ⇔ LEM. (7.49)
Proof. The direction “←” is easy: from X → 〈〈X〉〉, we get ¬¬X → ¬¬〈〈X〉〉. As 〈〈X〉〉 is
propositional, LEM gives us ¬¬〈〈X〉〉 → 〈〈X〉〉.
For the direction “→”, assume that P is a proposition. Thus, the type P + ¬P is a
proposition as well, and hence, the identity function on P + ¬P is constant.
It is straightforward to construct a proof of ¬¬ (P + ¬P ). By the assumption, this
means that P + ¬P is populated, i.e. every constant endomap on it has a fixed point.
Therefore, we can construct a fixed point of the identity function, which is equivalent to
proving P + ¬P .
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8. Propositional Truncation with Judgmental Computation Rule
Propositional truncation is often defined to satisfy the judgmental computation rule [27,
Chapter 3.7],
rectr(P, h, f, |x|) ≡β f(x) (8.1)
for any function f : X → P where x : X and P is propositional. In our discussion, we
did not assume it to hold so far. We certainly do not want to argue that a theory without
this judgmental equation is to be preferred, we simply did not need it. We agree with the
very common view (see the introduction of [27, Chapter 6]) that judgmental computation
rules are often advantageous, not only for truncations, but for higher inductive types [27,
Chapter 6] in general. Without them, some expressions will need to involve a ridiculous
amount of transporting, just to make them type-check, and the “computation” will have to
be done manually in order to simplify terms. If (8.1) is assumed, it suggests itself to also
assume a judgmental computation rule for the induction principle, that is
indtr(P, h, f, |x|) ≡β f(x), (8.2)
where P : ‖X‖ → U might now be a type family and f : Πz:‖X‖P (z) is a dependent function
rather than a simple function. Interestingly, it does not seem to be possible to construct
indtr from rectr such that (8.2) holds if (8.1) holds. In particular, the term constructed in
Lemma 3.7 does not have the expected judgmental computation rule.
Having said this, the judgmental β-rules do have some other noteworthy consequences.
Unlike the previous results, the statements in this part of our article do need the computa-
tion rules to hold judgmentally. So far, all our lemmata and theorems have been internal
to type theory. This is only partially the case for the results from this section, as any
statement that some equality holds judgmentally is a meta-theoretic property. We thus can
not implement such a statement as a type in a proof assistant such as Agda, but we can
still use Agda to check our claims; for example, if
p : x = y (8.3)
p :≡ reflx (8.4)
type-checks, we may conclude that the equality does hold judgmentally.
8.1. The Interval. The interval I as a higher inductive type [27, Chapter 6.3] is a type in
homotopy type theory that consists of two points i0, i1 : I and a path seg : i0 =I i1 between
them. Its recursion, or non-dependent elimination principle says: Given
Y : U (8.5)
y0 : Y (8.6)
y1 : Y (8.7)
p : y0 = y1, (8.8)
there exists a function f : I→ Y such that
f(i0) ≡ y0 (8.9)
f(i1) ≡ y1 (8.10)
apf (seg) = p. (8.11)
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For the interval’s induction principle, we refer to [27, Chapter 6.3]. The interval is a
contractible type and as such equivalent to the unit type. However, this does not make it
entirely boring; it is the judgmental equalities that matter. Note that the computation rules
for the points are judgmental (8.9,8.10), while the rule for the path (8.11) is only given by
an equality proof.
We will now show that ‖2‖ can be regarded as the interval.
Theorem 8.1. For the type ‖2‖, the recursion principle of the interval (including the com-
putational behavior) is derivable using (8.1), and the induction principle follows from (8.2).
Proof. We only show that the recursion principle is derivable, which will be sufficient for
the subsequent developments. The induction principle can be derived very similarly. We
need to show that, under the assumptions (8.5-8.8), there is a function f : ‖2‖ → Y such
that
f(|02|) ≡ y0 (8.12)
f(|12|) ≡ y1 (8.13)
apf (htr|02|,|12|) = p. (8.14)
We define
g : 2→ Σy:Y y0 = y (8.15)
g(02) :≡ (y0, refl) (8.16)
g(12) :≡ (y1, p). (8.17)
As Σy:Y y0 = y is contractible, g can be extended to a function g : ‖2‖ → Σy:Y y0 = y,
and we define f :≡ fst ◦ g. It is easy to check that f has indeed the required judgmental
properties (8.12) and (8.13). The equality (8.14) is only slightly more difficult: First, using
the definition of f and a standard functoriality property of ap [27, Lemma 2.2.2 (iii)], we
observe that apf (htr|02|,|12|) may be written as
apfst(apg(htr|02|,|12|)). (8.18)
But here, the path apg(htr|02|,|12|) is an equality in the contractible type (y0, refl) = (y1, p)
(note that both terms inhabit a contractible type themselves) and thereby unique. In
particular, it is equal to the path which is built out of two components, the first of which can
be chosen to be p (the second component can then be taken to be a canonically constructed
inhabitant of p∗(refl) = p).
8.2. Function Extensionality. It is known that the interval I with its judgmental compu-
tation rules implies function extensionality. We may therefore conclude that propositional
truncation is sufficient as well.
Lemma 8.2 (Shulman [22]). In a type theory with I and the judgmental η-law for functions
(which we assume), function extensionality is derivable.
Proof. Assume X,Y are types and f, g : X → Y are functions, and h : Πx:Xf(x) = g(x) a
proof that they are pointwise equal. Using the recursion principle of I, we may then define
a family
k : X → I→ Y (8.19)
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of functions, indexed over X, such that k(x, i0) ≡ f(x) and k(x, i0) ≡ g(x) for all x : X;
of course, we use h(x) as the required family of paths. Switching the arguments gives a
function
k′ : I→ X → Y (8.20)
with the property that k′(i0) ≡ f and k′(i1) ≡ g (by η for functions), and thereby
apk′(seg) : f = g.
The combination of Theorem 8.1 and Lemma 8.2 implies:
Corollary 8.3. In type theory with propositional truncation that satisfies the judgmental
computation rule, function extensionality can be derived.
8.3. Judgmental Factorization. The judgmental computation rule of ‖−‖ also allows us
to factor any function judgmentally through the propositional truncation as soon as it can
be factored in any way. This observation is inspired by and a generalization of the fact that
‖2‖ satisfies the judgmental properties of the interval (Theorem 8.1).
Theorem 8.4. Any (non-dependent) function that factors through the propositional trun-
cation can be factored judgmentally: assume types X,Y and a function f : X → Y between
them. Assume that there is f : ‖X‖ → Y such that
h : Πx:Xf(x) = f(|x|). (8.21)
Then, we can construct a function f ′ : ‖X‖ → Y such that, for all x : X, we have
f(x) ≡ f ′(|x|), (8.22)
which means that the type Πx:Xf(x) = f
′(|x|) is inhabited by the function that is constantly
refl.
Proof. We define a function
g : X → Πz:‖X‖Σy:Y y = f(z) (8.23)
g(x) :≡ λz.
(
f(x), h(x)  apf (htr|x|,z)
)
(8.24)
By function extensionality and the fact that singletons are contractible, the codomain of g
is contractible, and thus, we can extend g and get
g : ‖X‖ → Πz:‖X‖Σy:Y y = f(z). (8.25)
We define
f ′ :≡ λz : ‖X‖.fst(g z z) (8.26)
and it is immediate to check that f ′ has the required properties.
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Note that in the above argument we have only used (8.1). We have avoided (8.2) by
introducing the variable z in (8.23), which is essentially a duplication of the first argument
of the function, as it becomes apparent in (8.26).
Furthermore, we have assumed that f is a non-dependent function. The question
does not make sense if f is dependent in the sense of f : Πx:XY (x); however, it does for
f : Πx:XY (|x|). In this case, it seems to be unavoidable to use (8.2), but the above proof
still works with minimal adjustments. We state it for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 8.5. Let X be a type and Y : ‖X‖ → U a type family. Assume we have functions
f : Πx:XY (|x|) (8.27)
f : Πz:‖X‖Y (z) (8.28)
such that
Πx:Xf(x) =Y (|x|) f(|x|). (8.29)
Then, we can construct a function f ′ : Πz:‖X‖B(z) with the property that for any x : X, we
have the judgmental equality
f(x) ≡ f ′(|x|). (8.30)
Proof. Because we allow ourselves to use (8.2) the proof becomes actually simpler than the
proof above. This time, we can define
g : Πx:XΣy:Y y = f(|x|) (8.31)
g(x) :≡ (f(x), h(x)) . (8.32)
Using (8.2), we get
g : Πz:‖X‖Σy:Y y = f(z). (8.33)
Then,
fst ◦ g (8.34)
fulfils the required condition.
8.4. An Invertibility Puzzle. For a type X, the function |−| : X → ‖X‖ turns an
element x : X into an anonymous inhabitant |x| : ‖X‖. It is thus reasonable to think of |−|
as a function that hides information. However, as we will demonstrate, this interpretation
is only justified as long as we think of internal properties. We will show that the function
|−| does not erase any meta-theoretical information in the following sense: Assume z : ‖X‖
is defined to be |x| for some x : X. Without looking at this definition, we can recover x
(e.g. in a proof assistant, z could be imported from another file; then, we do not need to
open that file in order to find out x). To do this, we only need to observe how z computes
in a suitable environment. To be precise, we construct a term mystX such that, for any z
as above, the expression mystX(z) is judgmentally equal to x.
The meta-theoretic statement that we can recover x from z is true, but in general, mystX
might not be a closed term (i.e. could depend on some assumptions which do not influence
the computation). However, assuming the univalence axiom, mystX can be constructed
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without any further assumptions for a non-trivial class of types including the natural num-
bers. That is, in MLTT with propositional truncations and the univalence axiom, we can
construct a term mystN such that
id′ : N→ N (8.35)
id′ :≡ λn.mystN(|n|) (8.36)
type-checks and id′ is the identity function on N, with a proof
p : Πn:Nid
′(n) = n (8.37)
p :≡ λn.refln. (8.38)
We think that the possibility to do this is counter-intuitive and surprising. In particular it
may seem that we could apply apmystN on the canonical inhabitant of |0| =‖N‖ |1| to conclude
0 =N 1. However, this would only work if the type of mystN was ‖N‖ → N, which it is not;
it is a Π-type that is not easier to write down than the full definition of its inhabitant
mystN itself. In the following, we show the full construction. For further discussion, see
the homotopy type theory blog entry by the first named author [10], where this result was
presented originally.
First, let us state two useful general definitions:
Definition 8.6 (Pointed Types [27, Definition 2.1.7]). A pointed type is a pair (X,x) of a
type X : U and an inhabitant x : X. We write U• for the type of pointed types,
U• :≡ ΣX:UX. (8.39)
Definition 8.7 (Transitive Type). We say a type X is transitive and write isTransitiveX
if it satisfies
Πx,y:X(X,x) =U• (X, y). (8.40)
This is, of course, where univalence comes into play. It gives us the principle that a
type X is transitive if, and only if, for every pair (x, y) : X ×X there is an automorphism
exy : X → X such that exy(x) = y.
We have the following examples of transitive types:
Example 8.8. Every type with decidable equality is transitive.
This is because decidable equality on X lets us define an endofunction on X which
swaps x and y, and leaves everything else constant. Instances for this example include
all contractible and, more generally, propositional types, but also our main candidate, the
natural numbers N.
Example 8.9. For any pointed type X with elements x1, x2 : X, the identity type x1 =X x2
is transitive. In particular, the loop space Ωn(X) [27, Definition 2.1.8] is transitive for any
pointed type X.
Here, it is enough to observe that, for p1, p2 : x1 =X x2, the function λq.q  p1−1  p2 is
an equivalence with the required property.
As mentioned by Andrej Bauer in a discussion on this result [10], we also have the
following:
Example 8.10. Any group [27, Definition 6.11.1] is a transitive type.
As for equality types, the reason is that there is an inverse operation, such that the
automorphism λc.c  a−1  b maps a to b.
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Example 8.11. If X is any type and Y : X → U is a family of transitive types, then
Πx:XY (x) is transitive.
In particular, × and → preserve transitivity of types.
We are now ready to construct myst: Assume that we are given a type X. We can
define a map
f : X → U• (8.41)
f(x) :≡ (X,x). (8.42)
If we know a point x0 : X, we may further define
f : ‖X‖ → U• (8.43)
f(z) :≡ (X,x0). (8.44)
If X is transitive, we have
Πx:Xf(x) = f(|x|). (8.45)
By Theorem 8.4, there is then a function
f ′ : ‖X‖ → U• (8.46)
such that, for any x : X, we have
f ′(|x|) ≡ f(x) ≡ (X,x). (8.47)
Let us define
mystX : Πz:‖X‖fst(f
′(z)) (8.48)
mystX :≡ snd ◦ f ′. (8.49)
Note that while the type of mystX is not simply ‖X‖ → X, we have that, for any x : X, the
type of mystX(|x|) is judgmentally equal to X, and we have mystX(|x|) ≡ x. This already
proves the following:
Theorem 8.12. Let X be an inhabited transitive type. Then, there is a term mystX such
that the (dependent) composition
mystX ◦|−| : X → X (8.50)
type-checks and is equal to the identity, where the proof
p : Πx:X mystX(|x|) =X x (8.51)
p(x) :≡ reflx (8.52)
it trivial.
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It is tempting to unfold the type expression Πz:‖X‖fst(f ′(z)) in order to better under-
stand it. Unfortunately, this is not feasible as this plain type expression involves the whole
proof term f ′, which, in turn, includes the complete construction of Theorem 8.4. We want
to emphasize again that, while we do have htr|x|,|y| : |x| =‖X‖ |y| for any x, y : X, we cannot
conclude mystX(|x|) =X mystX(|y|) as the expression apmystX (htr|x|,|y|) does not type-check.
Finally, we want to remark that the construction of myst does not need the full strength
of Theorem 8.4. The weaker version in which f : ‖X‖ → Y is replaced by a fixed y0 : Y
is sufficient: in this case, f can be understood to be constant at y0. This leads to a
simplification as the dependent function types in (8.23) and (8.25) can be replaced by their
codomains.
It may be helpful to see the whole definition of myst explicitly in this variant, which is
also how it was explained originally by the first named author [10]: We define
f : X → ΣA:U• A =U• (X,x0) (8.53)
f(x) :≡ ((X,x), transitiveX(x, x0)), (8.54)
where transitiveX is the proof that X is transitive. The function f in (8.41) is then simply the
composition fst◦ f. As the codomain of f is a singleton, it is contractible (see Definition 2.1)
and thereby propositional (let us write h for the proof thereof). Hence, we get
f ′ : ‖X‖ → ΣA:U• A =U• (X,x0) (8.55)
f ′ :≡ rectr (ΣA:U• A =U• (X,x0)) h f. (8.56)
We could now define myst′X to be
myst′X : Π‖X‖fst ◦ fst ◦ f ′ (8.57)
myst′X :≡ snd ◦ fst ◦ f ′ (8.58)
which has the same property as (8.49), even though it is not judgmentally the same term.
9. Conclusion and Open Problems
In this article, generalizations of Hedberg’s Theorem have led us to an exploration of what
we call weakly constant functions. The attribute weakly indicates that higher coherence
conditions of such a constancy proof are missing. As a consequence, it is not possible to
derive a function ‖X‖ → Y from a weakly constant function X → Y , but we have shown
how to do this in several non-trivial special cases. Most interesting is certainly the case
of endofunctions. A weakly constant endofunction can always be factored through the
propositional truncation of its domain. Further, for a given X, the type which says that
every constant endofunction on X has a fixed point is propositional, enabling us to use it as
a notion of anonymous inhabitance 〈〈X〉〉, and we have argued that it lies strictly in between
of ¬¬X and ‖X‖.
There are two questions for which we have not given an answer. The first is: Is weak
propositional truncation definable in Martin-Lo¨f type theory? This is commonly believed
to not be the case. However, the standard models do have propositional truncation, making
it hard to find a concrete proof. Moreover, populatedness, a similar notion of anonymous
existence, is definable.
Our second question is about the consequences of the assumption that weakly constant
functions factor in general. By Shulman’s result [23], we know that this is inconsistent with
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the univalence axiom. Is is possible to strengthen this result further? In particular, does it
imply UIP for all types? We leave these questions open.
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